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₁ ．Introduction
　It is well known that inefficiency is an inevitable outcome of incentive schemes under 
adverse selection. The standard models found in textbooks are described as an agent re-
ceiving an optimal assignment from the principal when he or she possesses the best attri-
bute, such as lowest cost, and otherwise receiving suboptimal assignments, which are a 
source of inefficency. These assignments are designed with a view to satisfying the incen-
tive compatibility and individual rationality constraints, which assist the principal in ful-
filling their purpose, such as minimizing their own costs.
　This note evaluates the magnitude of the inefficiency incurred under the incentive 
schemes in adverse selection models. It also demonstrates that the inefficiency is of such 
significance that a simple contract, which ignores the heterogeneity among agents, can 
outperform in terms of total efficiency and the joint profit of the principal and the agent. It 
is assumed here that the simple contract negotiated with every agent is a uniform offer. 
That is, neither the menu nor the schedule provides incentives.
　Intuitively, the magnitude of the efficiency distortion may be assumed to be dependent 
on the dispersion of the agentsʼ attributes, such as their cost levels. Thus, it is expected 
that the simple contract provides a chance to outperform the incentive scheme when the 
dispersion becomes very high. However, the efficiency distortion may be much more se-
vere. It can be shown that, over a wide range of conditions, the incentive scheme is outper-
formed by the simple contract, although there remains the possibility that some incentive 
scheme yields greater joint profit.
　There are various types of principal-agent models with adverse selection. One type of 
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model completely ignores the payoffs of the agents. Indeed, in most procurement models, 
the profit of the supplier is neglected. In such models, the result presented in this note 
may provide some implications. When looking at a subcontracting system, that is, a trade 
between firms, focussing on the efficiency distortion may be worthwhile from a social wel-
fare viewpoint. Alternatively, if the principal and the agent are from separate divisions in 
a single firm, the firm will be concerned with the efficiency distortion as well as the rent 
earned by the agent. In such cases, the simple uniform contract without an incentive menu 
may be one of the options selected. The simple contract appears obsolete and highly con-
servative. However, there is a possibility that the outcomes may be preferable if the fixed 
assignment is properly chosen.
　McAfee and McMillan (1995) showed that the distortion caused by private information in 
a hierarchy becomes larger as the distance between the information source and the deci-
sion-maker increases. That is, the distortion can be accumulated in the hierarchy. The 
simple uniform contract is free from this problem in the hierarchy as the distortion cannot 
be accumulated due to the fixing of assignments.
　Various limits on the principal-agent models have been pointed out, such as multi-task 
agent problems.1） To add another item onto the long list is not the authorʼs intention. The 
inefficiency indicated here is not about a difficulty in the application of the model on the 
real situation, nor another possible variation of the model construction, but inherent in the 
very basic original model.
　In section 2 of this note, the basic model is constructed according to McAfee and McMil-
lan (1990, 1995). Subsequently, the two schemes are evaluated in terms of joint profits. Sec-
tion 3 examines both the quadratic revenue (linear demand) and linear cost cases and shows 
that the simple uniform contract outperforms the incentive scheme, irrespective of the dis-
tribution function of the agentʼs attribute. In section 4, in both the quadratic revenue and 
quadratic cost (linear marginal cost) cases, the possibility for the incentive scheme to out-
perform the simple uniform contract is demonstrated to be limited. Section 5 gives an appli-
cation of the analysis to a sub-contracting system. The last section provides some conclud-
ing remarks.
2 ．Model
　The construction of the model in this section follows the model in McAfee and McMillan 
(1990, 1995), which is constructed to analyze multi-tier Principal-Agent hierarchy, and is 
quite simple and easy to handle.
　In this model, there is a principal and an agent, both of which are risk-neutral. The prin-
cipal yields the revenue R(q) with level q, being the quantity, of something which is 
₁ ）　See Holmstrom and Milgrom [₁₉₉₁] or Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole [2₀₀₀].
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brought by the agent. The principal pays the price w(q) to the agent. The cost C(q,t) for the 
agent to produce this depends on q and the agentʼs type t, which is private information for 
the agent. R'(q)>0, R″(q)≤0, C t ≤0, C t q ≤0, C q >0, and C qq ≥0 are assumed. If the payoffs of 
the principal and the agent are denoted as ΠP and ΠA, respectively, then: 
Π P (q) ≡ R(q) － w(q),
Π A (q,t ) ≡ w(q) － C(q,t )
　Note that t is a form of performance index, and is distributed on the support [0,1]. The 
distribution function and the density function are F(t) and f(t) respectively. The inverse 
hazard function corresponding to F is defined as h F (t) ≡(1⊖F(t))/F'(t), and hF'(t) ≤0 is 
assumed.
　Given the price schedule w(q), the agent will choose q to maximize his or her payoff 
under the exogenously given value of t. Thus, the proposed q＊ is a function of the agentʼs 
type t as follows.
q＊（t） = argmax ΠA（q,t） 
q
The principal, therefore solves the problem using the below formulation. 
max E[ΠP（q＊（t）], s.t.   ΠA（q＊（t）,t） ≥ 0,∀t ∈ [0,1].
max E[ΠP（q*（t）], s.t.   ΠA（q*（t）,t） ≥ 0,∀t ∈ [0,1].
w（・）
Adopting the revelation principle, the analysis can be confined to truth-telling. As q＊(t) 
maximizes ΠA(q,t): 
ΠA（q＊（t）,t） = －Ct（q＊（t）,t）.ddt 
∂
∂t ΠA（q
＊（t）,t） =
by the envelop theorem. Thus, we have 
－Ct（q＊（τ）,τ）dτ.ΠA（q＊（t）, t） =
－Ct (q* (τ),τ)dτ.ΠA (q* (t),t) =
0∫
t
0
Subsequently, 
（ ）Ct（q＊（τ）, τ）dτ f（ t）dtE[ΠA（q＊（t）,t）] =－
1
0
t
0
（ ）f（t）dt Ct（q＊（τ）,τ）dτ=－
1
0
1
t
（1－F（τ） Ct（q＊（τ）,τ）dτ=－
1
0
Ct（q＊（τ）,τ） hF（τ）f（τ）dτ=－
1
0
Ct（q＊（t）,t） hF（t）f（t）dt=－
1
0
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Therefore, as 
E[ΠA（q＊（t）,t）] = E[w（q＊（t））－C（q＊（t）, t）] 
the result becomes 
E[ΠP（q＊（t））] = E[R（q＊（t））－w（q＊（t））] 
= E[R（q＊（t））－C（q＊（t）, t）] +  Ct（q＊（t）, t）hF（t）f（t）dt
1
0
= E[R（q＊（t））－ { C（q＊（t）, t）－
= E[R（q＊（t））－｛ C（q＊（t）, t）－
 Ct（q＊（t）, t）hF（t）} ]
implying that －C t(q＊(t),t)hF(t)≥0 is the information rent for the agent. q＊(t) should satisfy 
the first order condition （FOC）
R'（q＊（t））=Cq（q＊（t）,t）－C t q（q＊（t）, t）hF（t）. (₁)
Now, q＊(t) is the incentive scheme whose efficiency will be analyzed in this case.
　To evaluate the efficiency, a simple uniform contract for the agent is investigated under 
which he or she faces neither the choices of incentives nor menu. The principal ignores the 
heterogeneity of the agents and offers only a fixed level of q. This fixed q can be chosen at 
any level. For example, it could be set to maximize the expected value of the joint profit or 
to assume that the agentʼs type is the most inefficient.
　In our case, q will be set to maximize the expected value of the joint profit as a bench-
mark and this level is denoted by 
qM ≡argmax E[ΠP（q）+ ΠA（q,t）] = argmax E[R（q）－C（q,t）]
q q
As such, qM satisfies the FOC: 
R'（qM ）＝E[Cq（qM, t）] 
qM ≡argmax E[ΠP （q）+ ΠA（q,t）] = argmax E[R（q）－C（q,t）]
 (2)
₃ ．Comparison under quadratic-revenue and linear-cost
　In this section, the performance of the incentive scheme q＊(t) is evaluated by comparing 
the joint profits with that of the simple uniform contract, qM, where the revenue is qua-
dratic to q and the cost is linear to q. Specifically, we assume 
R (q) = (a－bq ) q　　and　　C (q,t ) = q・u (t)
In this case, a( > 0) and b( > 0) are parameters, and u'(t)≤ 0, u(t) > 0 for t ∈[0,1].
　Firstly, it is noted that q＊(t) is invariant for any transformation of the index t. That is,
　Lemma 1 If q＊(t) is the solution of the FOC (1), then q~＊(s)≡q＊(v(s)) satisfies the equation 
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with the index transformed by t＝v(s).
　Under this lemma, any arbitrary functional form can be chosen for u(t) by re-indexing 
the types of the agent. Here, a linear function u(t) = α-βt is chosen. This re-indexing leads 
to 
2b
q＊(t)＝（a－α＋β（t＋hF（t）））（α－βt） (3)
4b
Π＊(t)＝（a－α＋βt）
2－β 2 {hF（t）} 2  (4)
with Π＊ defined as Π＊（t）≡ΠP（q＊（t））+ΠA（q＊（t）, t）, being the joint profit under the incen-
tive scheme.
　On the other hand, under the simple no-incentive contract, the following results 
2b
qM  ＝ a－α＋β t
2b
（a－α＋β t）2
 (₅)
2b
4b
ΠM（t）  ＝ （a－α＋β t）
2
 (₆)
by FOC （2） with t¯ defined as the mean of t and ΠM being the joint profit when q is fixed to 
qM.
Comparing the expected value of the joint profits（4）and（6）2b
E[ΠM（t） ]－E [Π＊（t） ] {E[ {hF（t）} 2]－（E[t2]－{E[t]} 2）}4b
β 2
{E[ {hF（t）} 2]－Var（t）}4b
β 2
＝
＝
 (₇)
Using the following lemma, it can be seen that this equation is no less than 0 for any dis-
tribution function F(x) defined on the support [0,1] which satisfies hF'(t) ≤ 0.
　Lemma 2 For any distribution function F(x) defined on the support [0,1] which satisfies 
hF'（t）≤ 0, 2b
E[{hF（t）} 2 ]  ≥ Var（t）.
Thus, the following proposition results:
　Proposition 1 When the revenue is quadratic and the cost is linear to q, for any density 
function f(x) defined on the support [0,1] which satisfies hF'(t) ≤ 0, there exists a simple uni-
form contract offering fixed q that outperforms the incentive contract (1) in terms of the joint 
profit.
　It is notable that any transfer from the principal to the agent is not specified in the anal-
ysis, that is, no incentive constraint appears. A compensation arrangement should be pre-
pared for the agent to participate in the transaction regardless of his or her type.
324
₄ ．Comparison under quadratic-revenue and quadratic-cost
　Section 3 demonstrated that the joint profits under the incentive scheme are less than 
that under the simple no-incentive contract when a fixed q is appropriately chosen under 
the assumptions that demand and cost are linear to q. This section will show that it is not 
guaranteed that the simple no-incentive contract will outperform the incentive contract. 
There is a possibility, albeit limited, that the incentive scheme may provide a greater joint 
profit than the no-incentive contract.
　Under the incentive scheme, the agent with the highest attribute (t=1) is assigned an 
offer optimal for him or her, while under the simple no-incentive contract, he or she only 
receives a suboptimal offer. Agents with moderate attributes are assigned more preferable 
offers under the simple no-incentive contract because FOC (2) implies that the principal 
always assumes the agent as an average.
　Thus, the relative advantage of the incentive scheme is in the higher performance of the 
agent with the highest attribute. From this inference, the incentive scheme as a whole can 
also be assumed to show greater joint profit than the simple contract due to the greater 
discrepancy between the schemes or contracts of the performance of the agent with the 
highest attribute.
　When the cost function has a quadratic form, that is, one with increasing marginal cost, 
the advantage under the incentive scheme of the agent with the highest attribute has the 
potential to be significant. This is because this agent may have an insufficient assignment 
under the simple no-incentive contract due to the assumption that every agent has a mod-
erate attribute and the consequent setting of a restrained level q, which leads to an in-
creasing marginal cost. Thus, it can be deduced that the incentive scheme has advantages 
over the simple no-incentive contract where the marginal cost function becomes steeper.
　In this section the joint profit under the incentive scheme q＊(t) is compared with that 
under the simple contract specifying the cost and distribution functions. This is because 
analytical comparison is of greater difficulty. The revenue, R(q), cost, C(q,t), and distribu-
tion function are assumed to be:
R（q）=（a－bq）q
C（q, t）={（1－t）2+k}（ρq+θq2）
F（t）=₁－ t, f（t）=₁, and  hF（t）=₁－t.
In this case, a（> 0）, b（> 0）, ρ（≥ 0）, and θ（≥ 0） are parameters.
　Under this construction, q＊（t） is given by:
2（b + θ （k + 3（1－t）2））q
＊（t）＝ a － ρ （k + 3（1－t）
2）
Inefficiency in Incentive Schemes（Torii） 325
 by FOC (1), and 
4（b + θ （k + 3（1－t）2））2Π
＊（t）＝ a － ρ （k + 3（1－t）
2）
{ ρ（b（－k +（1－t）2 ）－θ（k +（1－t）2 ）（k + 3（1－t）2））+a（b+θ（k + 5（1－t）2））}
×
Also, qM and ΠM are: 
2（3b + θ （1 + 3k））’q
M＝ 3a － ρ （1 + 3k）
4（3b + θ （1 + 3k））2Π
M＝ ×{ a（3b－θ（1－3k + 3（－2 + t）t））3a－ρ（1 + 3k）
－ρ（θ（1 + 3k）（k +（1－t）2）－b（5 + 3k + 6（－2 + t）t））}
 and we then also have 
12（3b + θ （1 + 3k））E
[ΠM ]＝（3a － ρ （1 + 3k））
2
First, k is set to 0, indicating that the agent with the highest attribute has zero cost, which 
grants considerable advantage to him or her. In this case, the difference in joint profits is
9b E[Π
＊]－E[ΠM ]＝ －（a + ρ/ν）
2
（3 + ν）（1 + 3ν）  ν
3（3 + 7ν） 3ν3Arctan [       ]+{ }
where ν≡θ/b. The value of the terms in the parentheses of the right hand side (RHS) is 
shown in the Figure 1.
　Thus, when the slope of the marginal cost curve is very steep relative to the slope of the 
demand curve (i.e. when ν is high), the incentive scheme has the potential to outperform the 
simple contract without incentives.
　However, it is important to note that the possibility for the incentive scheme to outper-
form is realized under the extreme condition, k=0, where there exists considerable advan-
tage for the agent with the highest attribute. To examine this phenomenon, we set the 
0.04
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
ν
0.02
－0.02
－0.04
－0.06
Figure 1 ：A Part of  E[ Π＊] ⊖ E[ Π M]
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parameters as a=20, b=1, ρ=0 and compared the joint profits numerically. Figure 2 shows 
the result of this simulation. From the figure, it is implied that the possibility for the in-
centive scheme to outperform is limited to the region where k is sufficiently small, corre-
sponding to the most efficient agent having greater advantage, and θ is sufficiently large 
which relates to the marginal cost curve being very steep at q.
₅ ．An application to a sub-contracting system
　The model constructed in the section 2 based on McAfee and McMillan (1991, 1995) is a 
specific one, but it can be applied to various situations, as the basic structure of the trade 
between a principal and an agent is common to many cases. In this section, an example of 
application to a sub-contracting system is provided. This system will be a classical “Make 
or Buy” model.
　The system consists of an assembling firm (AF) and a part supplier (PS). In addition to 
buying from the PS, AF itself manufactures a fraction of the parts necessary to produce 
the final products. The marginal cost of parts production by AF increases as increasely 
more parts are self-supplied. Specifically, if AF decides to buy 100q percent of the parts 
necessary to produce one final good from PS and make 100(1⊖q) percent by itself, the cost 
for AF is w(q)+μ(1⊖q)2, where μ(> 0) is a constant, and w(q) is the payment to PS. The as-
sembly cost for AF is zero.
　The self providing production cost of the parts isμ(1⊖q)2. When AF does not buy any 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0 1 2 3 4 5
θ
k
E[Π＊]<E[ΠM ]
E[Π＊]>E[ΠM ]
Figure 2：Magnitude of  E[ Π＊] and E[ Π M]
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parts from PS, this cost is μ. When AF buys some parts from PS, the self providing pro-
duction cost is not proportional to q. This is because the parts are assumed to be heteroge-
neous. There are numerous parts or manufacturing processes which can be represented by 
a number in the interval [0,1]. When AF decides to produce a fraction of the parts by itself, 
it should choose the most advantageous items to be manufactured. The advantage for AF 
shrinks as AF makes increasingly more parts by itself, such that the marginal cost of 
self-supplying, 2μ(1⊖q), is an increasing function of 1⊖q. Hence, the diseconomies of scale 
for the increase of the ratio of self-production of its supplies is assumed. Therefore, q in 
this section is not the quantity, but the ratio of buying from PS.
　The production unit cost for PS is c (t) ≡c0+ (1⊖2t)η0, irrespective of the type of parts. 
When PS has the highest attribute (t=1), the cost is c0⊖η0, and when it has the lowest at-
tribute (t=0), the cost is c0+ η0. When PS produces 100q percent of the parts expected to be 
sold to AF, it costs PS c (t)q. Neither scale economies nor diseconomies are assumed. The 
attribute of PS distributes over the support [0,1] uniformly. That is, f (t)=1 and F(t)=t for 
t∈[0,1]. We assume μ is sufficiently large, such that the analysis herewith is only related 
to the case where PS has advantage in some aspect. The value of t is private information 
for PS that AF cannot observe and PS is cognizant of it as soon as a value is assigned to t. 
There is no asymmetry of information apart from the value of t. All other parameters, 
functions, and payoffs, including the distribution function F(t), are common knowledge.
　For simplicity, it is assumed that PS provides only one unit to AF and the revenue of AF 
is constant. As such, the problem is a cost-minimization. Under this construction, the mod-
el can be described using the settings developed in section 2, as follows: 
R（q） = a constant,
C（q, t） = μ（1－q）2 + q（c0+ （1－2t）η0 ）
h（t） = ₁－ t
Note that, although a part of the cost, μ(1－q)2, is incurred by AF, the same logic can be ap-
plied as if all the cost were due to PS as AF will have to pay the amount C(t, q) regardless 
of who incurs the cost.
　As such, the same procedure as detailed in section 2 gives:
2 μq
＊（t）＝ 1－ 4tu0－c0－3η0
2μq
M＝ 1－ c0
Π＊（t）＝ 4μ
c0（c0－4μ）－2（c0－2μ）（2t－1）η0 +（4t－3）η02
4μΠ
M（t）＝ c0（c0－4μ）+ 2η（c0－2μ）（1－2t）
4μE[Π
M ]＝ －c0，
c02
4μE[Π
＊]＝ －c0
c0－η02 2
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2 μq
＊（t）＝ 1－ 4tu0－c0－3η0
2μq
M＝ 1－ c0
Π＊（t）＝ 4μ
c0（c0－4μ）－2（c0－2μ）（2t－1）η0 +（4t－3）η02
4μΠ
M（t）＝ c0（c0－4μ）+ 2η（c0－2μ）（1－2t）
4μE[Π
M ]＝ －c0，
c02
4μE[Π
＊]＝ －c0
c0－η02 2
where R(q), the constant, is set to 0 for simplicity.
　Thus, under this construction the simple uniform offer qM dominates the incentive 
scheme q＊(t) in the expected value of the joint profit. It is significant that AF can clearly 
earn greater profit under the incentive scheme than under the uniform offer. The result 
presented here demonstrates that enhancing the total performance of a cooperative system 
is not independent from the task of activating an appropriate incentive mechanism. This 
result may affect the distribution of stakes. The benefits from truth-telling on allocative 
efficiency may be less than the cost of motivating truth-telling, such that total efficiency 
may shrink under the incentive scheme. The payoff of the prime contractor also increases 
as the expense of the subcontractor.
　This note does not claim that the simple uniform offer always provides better outcomes 
in the sub-contracting contract. Rather, it points out that the outcomes depend on the set-
ting of the functional form of the cost. Nevertheless, it should be noted that an incentive 
scheme enabled by tight communications between AF and PS does not always produce 
higher efficiency, and may possibly be used as a device to realize a transfer from PS to AF.
₆ ．Concluding Remarks
　It is shown that the efficiency distortion caused by the incentive scheme is of such signif-
icance that a simple uniform assignment ignoring the heterogeneity of the agents can out-
perform the joint profit by the incentive scheme in the wider region of the parameter 
space. It is only where the agent with the highest attribute demonstrates a better capabili-
ty and the slope of the marginal cost is very steep that the incentive scheme is found to 
have a chance to outperform.
　In reality, the stubborn and conservative assignments being fixed in nature may display 
some rationality. A division in a firm will generally not interfere in another divisionʼs busi-
ness even where their performance is excellent.
　As stated in the last part of section 3, compensation arrangements should be prepared as 
any transfer from the principal to the agent is not specified in the analysis. If such an 
arrangement is difficult to implement, the setting of q according to the assumption that 
the agent possesses the lowest attribute is a possible solution. Under the arrangement, 
every agent receives rent, C(q,0) －C(q,t), which is no less than 0. Even under such an 
absurd scheme, inferior performance will not eventuate as compared with the incentive 
scheme.
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Appendix A: A Proof of Lemma 1
　Equation (₁) is the solution for the maximization problem: 
Replacing t with v(s) in this problem results in:
 
and 
Appendix B: A Proof of Lemma 2
　First, consider the inequality: 
This inequality is expanded as a polynomial of λ: 
As the inequality holds for any real value of λ, the discriminant of the quadratic form: 
is not greater than ₀. Thus, 
[R（q＊（t））– {C（q＊（t）,t）– Ct（q＊（t）,t）hF（t）}]max Eq＊(.)
[R（q＊（v（s）））– {C（q＊（v(s））,v（s））–    Ct（q＊（v（s））,v（s））hf（s）}]max Eq＊(.)
~ ~∂
∂s
hF （s）≡（1–F（s））/f（s）, F（s）≡ F（v（s））, and
~~~~ ~ f（s）≡ f（v（s））~ because:Here,
C（q＊（v（s））,v（s））= Ct（q＊（v（s））,v（s））v'（s）,
∂
∂s
~
h f （s）=           =                   =
hF （v（s））~~ 1–F（s）~F'（s）
1–F（v（s））
F'（v（s））v'（s） v'（s）
1
0
{hF （t）+ λ}2 f（t）dt ≥ 0.
1
0
1
0
1
0
{hF（t）}2 f（t）dt + 2λ   hF （t）f（t）dt + λ2       f（t）dt ≥ 0.
{    hF （t） f（t）dt}2 –    {hF （t）}2 f（t）dt       f（t）dt
1
0
1
0
1
0
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 (B₁)
because: 
by integral by parts, and ʃ₁₀ f (t)dt = ₁.
　Next, 2(M₁(F))2≥ M2(F) is shown for distribution function F(t) which satisfies hF' (t) ≤ ₀. Here, Mi (F) 
is a functional defined by
for i=₁,2,…. Also, we have F'(t) = f (t). Note that
and 
　Consider two distribution functions, F a(t) and F b(t), which assumes the difference is a small 
variation function, ϵF, i.e. F b(t) = F a(t) + ϵF, and the functional M₁(F a) and M₁(F b) are the same. 
Without loss of generality M 2(F b) > M 2(F a) is assumed. Then there exist points tA and tB 
( ₀ < tA < tB < ₁) such that, ₁－F a(tA) > ₁－F b(tA) and ₁－F b(tB) > ₁－F a(tB). Obviously they can be 
chosen to satisfy f a(tA) = f b(tA) and f a(tB) = f b(tB) (See Figure ₃ ).
Then 
1
0
{hF（t）}2 f（t）dt ≥ {    tf（t）dt}2
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
hF（t） f（t）dt =    （1–F（t））dt =（1–F（t））t   +    t f（t）dt =     t f（t）dt
1
0
Mi（F ）≡    tif（t）dt
1
0
M1（F ）= –（1–F（t ））t   +    （1–F（t ））dt =   （1–F（t））dt,
1
0
1
0
1
0
M2（F ）= –（1–F（t ））t2   + 2   （1–F（t ））tdt = 2   （1–F（t））tdt.
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1－Fa
1－Fb
1tA tB
t
Figure 3 ：₁－F a and ₁－F b
hF a （tA）=              >              = hF b（tA）,
1ｰF a（tA）
f a（tA）
1ｰF b（tA）
f b（tA）
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 and 
which imply that if the distribution function F a(t) satisfies the condition h'Fa (t)= ₀  for t ∈ [₀,₁], the 
functional M2(F b) cannot take the greater value keeping M₁(F b) equal to M₁(F a) without violating 
the condition h'Fb(t) ≤ ₀  somewhere in t ∈ [₀,₁], while the functional M2(F b) has room to take some 
greater value if there exists a point t such that h'Fa (t) < ₀.
　Thus if a distribution function F(t) maximizes the functional M2(F) keeping the functional M₁(F) 
constant and the constraint h'F (t) ≤ ₀, (i.e. if F(t) is a stationary function of this calculus of 
variation,) then F(t) has to satisfiy the condition h'F (t)=₀, which implies a function hF (t):
The distribution function and density function corresponding to this specified h f (t) are: 
and f～(t) =e⊖t /γ(₁/γ+ δ(₁－ t)), respectively. Hereγis a positive constant and δ(.) is Diracʼs delta 
function.
and 
So, 
For the function k(γ) ≡γe⊖ ₁/γ－γ+ ₁, we find that k(γ) > ₀  forγ≥ ₀  because: 
hF a （tB) =              <              = hF b（tB),
1ｰF a（tB)
f a（tB)
1ｰF b（tB)
f b（tB)
hF （t）= γ  （ 0 ≤ t < 1）0  （t = 1）.
F（t）= 1 ‒ e
–t/γ  （0 ≤ t < 1） 
0          （ t = 1）.
~
M1（F ）=         dr + e–1/γ = ‒ te–t/γ    +    e–t/γ dt + e–1/γ~ te
–t/γ
 
γ
= γ（1 ‒ e–1/γ）
1
0
1
0
1
0
M2（F ）=         dt + e–1/γ = ‒ t2e–t/γ    + 2   te–t/γ dt + e–1/γ
1
0
~ t2e–t/γ 
γ
= 2γ (γ ‒（γ + 1 ）e–1/γ）.
1
0
1
0
2M1（F ）2 ‒M2（F ）= 2 { γ（1 ‒ e–1/γ）}2 ‒ 2γ（γ ‒（γ + 1）e–1/γ）
~ ~
= 2γe–1/γ { γe–1/γ ‒ γ + 1 } .
lim k
γ→0
（γ） =  1,
γ→∞
lim γ（e–1/γ ‒ 1 ）+ 1 = lim　　　　+ 1
γ→∞ γ→∞
（γ） =  e
–1/γ ‒ 1
1/γ
lim               + 1 =  lim　　　+ 1 = ‒ 1 + 1 = 0
γ'→0
=  e
–γ' ‒ 1
γ'
‒ e–γ'
1γ'→0
lim k
γ→∞
lim γ（e–1/γ ‒ 1 ）+ 1 = lim　　　　+ 1
γ→∞ γ→∞
（γ） =  e
–1/γ ‒ 1
1/γ
lim               + 1 =  lim　　　+ 1 = ‒ 1 + 1 = 0
γ'→0
=  e
–γ' ‒ 1
γ'
‒ e–γ'
1γ'→0
lim k
k'（γ） =   (1 +    ) e–1/γ ‒ 1 ,1γ
lim k'
γ→0 γ→0 γ→0
（γ） =  0 + lim        ‒ 1 = lim                     ‒ 11/γ
e1/γ
‒ 1/γ2
– 1/γ2 ∙ e1/γ
γ→0
=  lim        ‒ 1 = 0 – 1 = ‒ 1 ,1e1/γ
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Then, 2 (M₁(F～))2 ≥ M2(F～), which implies 
for any density function such that hF' (t) ≤ ₀. The equality holds whenγ→ ∞; h(t)=₀, F(t)=₁ and 
f (t) =δ(t) for ₀ ≤ t ≤ ₁.
　With the inequality (B₁),
for any density function defined on the support [₀,₁] which satisfies the constraint hF' (t) ≤ ₀.
γ→∞
（γ） =  0 ,lim k'
–      e–1/γ + (1 +   )     e–1/γ =     e–1/γ > 0.1γ2 1γ2 1γ31γk''（γ） =
2（M1（F））2 = 2(M1（F））2 ≥ M2（F）≥ M2（F）～ ～
{hF （t）}2 f（t）dt ≥    tf  （t）dt 
2
≥    t2f（t）dt－   tf（t）dt  
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